One Rank One Pension – An Approach

By Rear Admiral Alan O’Leary (Retd)

Ex -Chairman PARC Sixth CPC

Introduction:

1. For sometime past, I have contemplated putting my thoughts together on OROP (One rank, one pension) and penning them down, in such a way that the reader could appreciate the nuances of the subject, that would eventually lead to some of our intellectuals ,examining the issue in its entirety and determining a way ahead. It would be presumptuous on my part to assume, that I could put all the facts down, but am attempting to focus on the main issues, that I feel could be brought into our case. I would like to place on record, that I am in full agreement with the article written by Group Capt AG Bewoor, on 21 Mar 11, that was circulated on the IESM network.

Complications - OROP:

2. OROP, is not a simple issue, which has been further complicated by the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, in a similar fashion as was done in the Fourth Pay Commission, when a vertical Pay Band, created ostensibly, to address stagnation in the ranks of Armed Forces officers, up to the rank of Brigadier, laid the cornerstone for denigration of ranks, within the Armed Forces. This happened, because Rank pay was introduced up to the rank of Brigadier but was subsumed from the replacement scale, instead of being given over and above the replacement scale (this is the famous Major Dhanapalan case for which a final decision is awaited from the Supreme Court). Furthermore, because Major Generals and above did not get Rank pay, those Major Generals who retired prior to the fourth CPC, found their pensions lower than that of a Brigadier, which was much later brought at par. Some justice.

3. The Sixth Pay Commission, introduced pay promotions, for the All India Services and the Organised Group A services, on a non-functional basis up to the HAG Grade, but did not consider it fit to extend this largesse to officers of the Armed Forces whose pay traditionally was at par with the Organised Group A services.

Functioning of the Pay Commission:

4. I will not delve on why OROP is required. This aspect has been clearly brought out by Group Capt Bewoor. One aspect of his article however is worth mentioning and I will restate it. He, like all members of the Services Pay Cells, in the Sixth Pay Commission, always wondered why, the Pay Commission (and subsequently those same individuals, who continued to function in the Finance Ministry, after the Pay Commission was wound up) in examining the issues relating to Fauji's, came out with solutions, “crafted with deliberate cussedness and meanness". All Pay Commissions (3, 4, 5 and 6) had Armed Forces Pay Cells that interacted with the Pay Commission. Some to a greater extent and some to a lesser extent. I understand that in the Fifth Pay Commission, there was hardly any interaction. What was common in all cases, however, was the fact that the Armed Forces Pay Cells, had dedicated and competent Officers, who did their homework and in no time at all, could present their cases, or clarify issues to the Pay Commission.

5. The Pay Commissions were always headed by an eminent Jurist, but there was no opportunity given to the Armed Forces Pay Cells, to clarify issues or to defend themselves, during the proceedings, with him present. The whole exercise was carried out behind closed doors at the whims of bureaucrats in the commission. The Armed Forces were never informed of the devious methodologies being determined, that would always put them on the back foot. If they were, I am sure many of the anomalies could have been easily resolved, before the recommendations were finalised. The Sixth CPC even boasted, that for quicker decision making (and secrecy) their Officer complement was kept to a minimum. Their final recommendations, were given to the Armed Forces Pay Cells the night before the recommendations were placed in the public domain, at a dinner hosted by them, at the India International Centre. I am saying this, so that the reader can understand, why it was necessary for the Armed Forces Pay Cells, to try and get back what was denied in the first instance. Furthermore, as I already stated, the same individuals who crafted the Sixth CPC recommendations, were promptly appointed to the Finance Ministry, so that they could continue their mission to sidestep and deflect our objections, which they did with considerable success.

Unfinished agenda of the Sixth CPC:

6. In my first e-mail, I had mentioned, that there were two issues that bothered me the most and which were swept under the carpet. The first, concerned the status of Lt Colonels, who being in a higher Pay Scale compared to civil servants (equivalent to Commandant in the Para military services) prior to the Sixth CPC, were given a lower Grade Pay of Rs 8000, instead of Rs 8700. The second and equally vital issue was the introduction of a methodology to isolate the Service Officer from the largesse proposed for Organised Group A Officers. The latter, would ensure that during the currency of the Sixth CPC, almost all officers of the Organised Group A services, would cross the rubicon of Pay Band 4 and move to HAG, whereas 99% Service Officers will be stuck in Pay Band 4. Sadly, though the PARC had got the COSC approval (July 2008), to place on record the objections of the Armed Forces to the Government, this has not been progressed. This, if not ironed out, will have very serious consequences for the Pay equivalence and status of Armed Forces Officers in the future. It also means that the Civil Services have taken our lead and given unto themselves OROP, which is at the moment enjoyed by Lt Generals and above, who are placed in HAG and HAG +. A mere 0.02% of the Officer cadre in the Armed Forces, vis a vis 100% of Officers from the Organised Group A services. I would also like to point out, that PARC had fought and brought Lt Generals (non C-in-C) into HAG. They were earlier also in Pay Band 4. Thus, within the same Pay Band, the difference in pay (Lt Col to Lt Gen), were the increments on account of length of Service and Grade Pay. For pensions for those who retired prior to 1 Jan 2006, the difference in pension between a Lt Colonel and Lt General was half the difference of Grade Pay. This changed only subsequently for Lt Generals (non C-in-C).

Pay promotions for IAS Officers and other Organised Group A services on a Non-Functional basis:

7. The Govt have approved the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, (Art 3.3.12, Page 174, of the Sixth CPC recommendations) which states, “The Govt. should consider batch-wise parity while empanelling and\or posting at Centre between respective batches of the IAS and other Organised Group A services, with the gap being restricted to 2 years. Whenever any IAS Officer of a particular batch is posted in the Centre to a particular grade, carrying a specific grade pay in PB 3 or PB 4, grant of a higher Pay Scale on non-functional basis to officers belonging to batches of organised Group A services, that are senior by two years or more, should be given by the Government”. Subsequently, the Govt. have also clarified that an Officer in the civil services, who has completed 5 years in the SAG grade will be given a pay promotion to the HAG scale on a non-functional basis.

8.  In connection with the above, I would like to add that a Joint Secy to the Govt of India and a Major General equivalent, are SAG officers, but in protocol are higher than SAG officers of the Organised Group A services, who are not appointed to the post of Joint Secy to the Govt of India. This means, that an Organised Group A Service Officer, will attain SAG grade in 18 years (2 years astern of the IAS). He will not be equivalent to a Major General in protocol but would move up to the HAG grade (Lt General) on a non functional, pay promotion basis in 23 years, whereas a Brigadier if selected, is promoted to Major General in 32 years (SAG grade) and in most cases will retire in that grade. A mere 30% of Major Generals will attain HAG grade. The other Major Generals retiring in the SAG grade even though they may have completed 5 years of service in that grade. Is such a gross disparity acceptable to the Armed Forces?

9. The above provisions, made by the IAS for themselves and the Organised Group A services, will keep them laughing all the way to the bank, not only in their service career, but also in their retirement. These provisions facilitate them leap frogging to higher posts on a non functional basis, with the pay of higher posts, whereas the Armed Forces Officer stagnates in rank and at the end of it all, 99% will retire in Pay Band 4.The question is, how is it that pay promotions on a non functional basis, are within the realm of reasonability, when it pertains to the IAS and Organised Group A services, but is absolutely unacceptable for the Armed Forces. This disparity and bias I am sure, is without precedent anywhere in the world. One of the specious arguments used by the Finance Ministry is that, consequent to the AVS Committee report, Majors are promoted to Lt Colonel in 13 years, by time. How unholy an unorthodox, but are they able to explain how they have gone even further for the civil services in their proposals at Article 3.3.12. Is it an acceptable logic that IAS Officers are mature enough to attain the SAG grade in 16 years (maximum), whereas Armed Forces officers need 32 years to reach the same level?. Yet another oft repeated, half truth, is that Armed Forces officers are commissioned at the age of 20 years and IAS Officers join at 28 years. In other words, the Armed Forces Officer has to pay the price of qualifying earlier, after meeting the graduation criteria and also getting through the Services Selection Board and still losing out to the Organised Group A services Officer. What they conveniently gloss over, is that they enjoy a full career up to 60 years and beyond, whereas 99% of Armed Forces officers, retire between 54 to 58 years. Furthermore, the IAS lobby ensures that 90% of their kin continue to serve in various capacities in the Government up to the age of 65 and beyond. A case for raising the retirement age of Civil Government servants to 65 years is in fact being currently considered by the DoP&T.

10. One aspect, always brought out by the Finance Ministry, is that all those who joined the Civil Services, post 1 January 2004, will be governed by a New pension scheme that is self contributory, unlike the Armed Forces that continue to enjoy a pension scheme. First of all, nobody can say for certain, that there will be no change of policy in 2024. Secondly, this does not make martyrs of those who joined the Civil Services, before 1 January 2004 for which they need to give themselves fast track pay promotions and eventually the highest slab to retire from.

Key Issues-OROP:

11. The following are the main reasons for OROP: -

· Giving the Armed Forces officer, the same pay promotions on a non-functional basis, as approved by the Govt, for the All India Services and the Organised Group A services (Article 3.3.12 of the Sixth CPC report).

· Reducing the disparity in pensions, between those who retire in the currency of a Pay Commission and those who retired earlier.

· Ensuring that an Armed forces officer is correctly compensated for his length of service and rank in which he retired (Comparable to the Organised Group A services).

· Rationalising the pension gaps between ranks, with special emphasis on those ranks in which a large number of officers retire (Major and Lt Col).

· Bridging the pension gaps, resulting from the skewed imbalance, caused by adjusting all ranks from Major General and below, within Pay Band 3 & 4. This is further compounded, as pre 1 January 2006 pensioners, are brought down to the minimum of the Band in which they retired and the difference in pensions being half the difference of Grade Pay.

· Addressing the issue of Armed Forces officers, stagnating below, Joint Secy level, due to their traditional rank structures and denying them pay promotions, at par with the changes invoked for the All India Services and Organised Group A services. This, despite the fact that successive Pay Commissions have ruled that parity needs to be maintained between the Armed Forces and the Organised Group A services.

· Stepping up (notionally) the pensions of Majors who retired in the previous pay commissions and who are now affected in their present pensions, which are based on 13 years of service, whereas these officers in the past had served at least 20 years before they took premature retirement.

· Protection to retired Armed Forces officers whose pensionary status has been reduced, consequent to Cadre reviews of the Organised Group A services, thereby upsetting the parity that existed at the time of their retirement (Status of a Lt Col, who retired prior to the Sixth CPC, was higher than a Commandant in the para military forces. There is thus no reason why, these officer’s pension should now be lower than a Commandant of the para military forces).

Pension Structure:

12. Consequent to adjustments, post the Sixth CPC report, the levels of pensions for various ranks in the Officer Cadre, as also family pensions, have been promulgated vide a MoD letter of 15 Nov 2010. These are indicated below –

Serial	Rank	Officer’s Pension	Family Pension
(a)	Lt (Army)	Rs 13,500	Rs 8,100
(b)	Capt (Army)	Rs 13,850	Rs 8,310
(c)	Major	Rs 14,100	Rs 8,460
(d)	Lt Col	Rs 25,700	Rs 15,420
(e)	Col	Rs 26,050	Rs 15,630
(f)	Brigadier	Rs 26,150	Rs 15,690
(g)	Major General	Rs 26,700	Rs 16,020
(h)	Lt General	Rs 36,500	Rs 21,900
(j)	Army Commander	Rs 40,000	Rs 24,000
(k)	Army Chief	Rs 45,000	Rs 27,000

13. The table indicates qualifying service from 10 years to 30 years and the amount of pension indicated is inclusive of the Rank weightage admissible that varies from 9 years for Lt (Army) to 3 years for a General.

Service required for maximum pension:

14. Pension in a rank, varies depending on the length of service that plateaus at different levels, depending on the Rank in which the Officer retired, as shown below

(a)	Lt(Army) to Capt (Army)	24 Years
(b)	Major	25 Years
(c)	Lt Col(TS)	28 Years
(d)	Lt Col (Select)	26 Years
(e)	Col(TS &Select)	26 Years
(f)	Brigadier	28 Years
(g)	Major General and above	30 Years

15. From the above it is obvious, that the Pay Band structure coupled with a methodology of adjusting pensions at the minimum of the Pay Band in the subsequent Pay Commission is designed to cause dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces, but is perfectly suited to the changes invoked by the Sixth CPC for the AIS and Organised Group A Services, where officers will stagnate (if this is the correct term) at the highest levels, all crossing the HAG barrier, whereas, in the Armed Forces 99% officers will stagnate in Pay Band 4.

Fault lines in the pension structure:

16. These are indicated below-

· The difference of pension of a Lt Col ( Select) who retires after 26 years of service is only Rs. 1,000 less than a Major General with over 30 years service

· The difference in pension between a Col (Battalion Commander) and a Brigadier (Brigade Commander), who retired before 1 Jan 2006, is Rs 100. (3 cone ice-creams or one bottle of rum and a packet of Lays)

· The difference in pension between a Lt Col and Brigadier, who retired prior to 1 Jan 2006, is Rs 450. And the rank of Brigadier is attained after an officer qualifies two promotion Boards.

· Artificial gulfs have been created between Majors and Lt Colonels (Rs 11,600) and also between Major Generals and Lt Generals, non C-in C (Rs 9,800). The question is whether the convenience to adhering to artificially created barriers is logical and acceptable.

· For ranks at the bottom of the scale (PB - 3 and higher), the pensionary awards are reasonable i.e. in the ranks of Lt (Army), Lt Col, Lt Gens and above. Offcourse as brought out earlier, the Armed Forces need to press for an enhancement of Grade  pay of Lt Col from Rs 8000 to Rs 8700,which was a faulty and arbitrary dispensation, when it became inevitable for the Govt to bring Lt Col's to Pay Band -4.

· For ranks not mentioned above, the pensionary awards should have been spaced out more evenly for pensions. In this connection, the Sixth CPC found no difficulty in creating four Pay Bands above the SAG scale i.e. HAG, HAG+, Secy to the Govt of India and Cabinet Secy scales. However, they only devised a single scale below SAG, which has caused so much heart burn in the Armed Forces, since 99% officers currently retire in that scale, as against 100% IAS officers who go up to the Apex scale.

Recommendations on OROP:

17. In my opinion, on first principle, the Armed Forces Officer, must be given the same benefits sanctioned by the Govt for officers of the organised Group A services, as successive Pay Commissions have ruled that, there should be pay parity between officers of the Armed Forces and the Group A services in general and the Indian Police, in particular. Even the Sixth CPC, have not made any comment to the contrary. Further, this needs to be done, immediately, as there is no justification whatsoever, for stymieing pay progression of an Armed Forces officer, on a non- functional basis(not linked to the extant rank structure) for pay enhancement up to the HAG level. It is only then that we can achieve a true OROP. Since this is an acceptable principle for the AIS and the Organised Group A services, there is no rationale for excluding Armed Forces Officers from this scheme. Ofcourse, it will actually benefit officers who will retire in the future, yet it will have to be taken into account, for pension fixation for those who retired before the next CPC. It may be relevant to point out that Lt Gens(non C -in C ) were placed in PB -4,by the Sixth CPC, but were subsequently raised to the HAG + scale after hardnosed negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that they were not in this scale, when they retired. Hence there is no reason, why Colonels and Brigadiers cannot also finally attain the HAG grade prior to retirement. This will only place them at par with their counterparts in the Group A services. Furthermore, a precedent exists in the fifth CPC, where Brigadiers owing to Rank Pay, drew more pension than a Maj Gen.

18. I believe that the dividing line for promotions in the Armed Forces is extremely fine and with promotional posts so limited, even outstanding Officers are not promoted, due to deep selection. We therefore cannot lose this opportunity of also taking Colonels and Brigadiers to the HAG scale, on a non - functional, pay promotion basis. In the Armed Forces, the rank and command structures are well defined and understood. Even today, a Colonel serving in the glacier or, a Capt(Navy) from the Aviation or submarine arms, would draw more pay in real terms than a Maj General or a  Rear Admiral from the the general service. But that does not dilute the command structure. Yet, I know that there will be some reservations amongst the top management of the Armed Forces to accept this, whose doubts will be fuelled by those in the Finance Ministry. However could those at the helm of the Finance Ministry, then explain their actions with regard to the assured career progression from Pay Band -3, up to the HAG scale, for themselves and also for the Organised Group A services? My biggest fear is that if this anomaly is not corrected, then in the next Pay Commission, these differences will be fully exploited to further dilute, the status and pay of Armed Forces officers. This therefore requires immediate correction.

19.  Notwithstanding the above, we need to also readjust pensionary benchmarks, for our retired fraternity, so that the differences in pension compensate a retired officer meaningfully, for his length of service and rank, in which he retired. Also, protecting the officers who retired, before changes in the time spent in the lower ranks was reduced, post the AVS Committee report. The methodology, of bunching various ranks and bringing them down to the minimum of the Pay Band, is clearly unsuited to the Armed Forces. Horizontal bands or striations are necessary and desirable. Taking into account the table at para 12 above, the following minimum pensions are suggested:-

(a) Lt(Army)  - Rs 13,500.(No change, as an officer who retired in this rank, would have spent, only 3-4 years, as a commissioned officer)

(b) Capt (Army) - Rs 16,500. (As an officer in this rank would have spent 11 years as a commissioned officer)

(c) Major - Rs 19,500 (An officer who retired in this rank, would have at least completed time for pension i.e. 20 years)

(d) Lt Col - Rs 25,700. (No change, as this pension is given to a Lt Col, who has completed 26 years of service)

(e) Brigadier - Rs 31,500. (An officer who retired in this rank, even prematurely, would have completed at least 32 years of service)

(f) Major Gen - Rs 33,500. (This pension is recommended as less than 1% of Armed Forces officers attain Flag Rank)

OROP -Other Ranks:

20.  In this paper, I have not discussed this subject, as there are many other factors that are quite different as compared to Officers. Firstly their careers are truncated to a far greater extent. Secondly, although their pensions are decided at the top of the scale in which they retired, even with the assured career progression approved by the Sixth CPC, they may not be able to get the third pay promotion before they retire, unlike civil servants. Consequent to the Sixth Pay Commission awards, there were positive changes made to the modified assured career progression methodology for civilians that have so far not been made applicable to the other ranks of the Armed Forces. This is therefore a subject that needs to be considered separately, which will follow in a subsequent article.

Conclusion:

21. This paper seeks to bring out issues that, if not corrected, will result in a sense of despondency and disillusionment amongst the officer cadre of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces officer does not desire more compensation, either in his service career or after his retirement. He just wants, what justifiably should have come his way, without having to fight for his rights. Lowering of his status and thereby his pay, without a valid reason, cannot help keep his morale high. Unfortunately the Armed Forces have never shown the resolve they display in battle, as do when it comes to matters pertaining to their pay and perks. This is all the more reason, why they should be treated with the respect that is their due.

RIP - Air Chief Marshal Denis Anthony Lafontaine

Retired Air Chief Marshal Denis Anthony Lafontaine, who played a key
role in Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, died of heart attack on
Wednesday 6th April 2011 at his residence in Medak district of Andhra
Pradesh.
Lafontaine had been staying at his farm house near Brahmanapalli village
in Medak district since his retirement. He became unconscious at 2000
hrs on and died later before medical assistance could reach him.
He was 82 and is survived by his wife and three daughters.
Lafontaine served as Air Chief Marshal between 1985 and 1988.
He was born in Chennai on September 17, 1929. His grandfathers as well
as his father also served in the Indian Army. Lafontaine joined Indian
Air Force as a fighter pilot in 1950 and rose in ranks to become its
13th Chief in July 1985.
He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (VSM), Ati-Vishisht Seval Medal and
Param-Vishisht Seva Medal in his illustrious career.
Medak district Collector S Suresh Kumar laid a wreath on Lafontaine's
body on behalf of Andhra Pradesh government and paid homage.
Lafontaine was cremated in the village on Wednesday evening.

Ramesh HT

An Open Letter to the Very Young Officer

By C. N. W.

(From the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. LXII., February to November, 1917)

My Dear Blanc Bec,--

Because you are so young and have so recently been turned out of the nest, it seems to me that the French name for an immature birdling, newly fledged and pale, still, as to the colour of its beak, is more applicable to you, the officer fledgling, than the other term of Bluet which the French apply to the young bloom, the sapling, otherwise the Flower of the Army, or than our English term of youngster- and so I address you as Blanc Bec.

But though your beak is pale, betokening immaturity of experience, you have got all your feathers and can use your wings, so there is a certain amount of danger that, as in the case of other young birds when they first set out to fly about on their own--especially young warrior birds-you may butt into things through inexperience.

For being in the Blanc Bec stage I envy and congratulate you--I, who, as an old bird, am relegated to a dull .perch in the Senior Aviary alongside of other old birds whose cry is in effect--though most of them would express it otherwise--"Eheu fugaces, postume, postume--alas! for the days that are lost to me, lost to me."

Still, moulty as we may be from age, some of us in our day have flown strenuously, if not always successfully, and we all regard with interest the early flights of the Blanc Bec of to-day, remembering our own callow youth, and are moved to croak our warnings to you as to what to avoid.

In the Old Army the great majority of the officers were drawn from the class, or genus, which in the bird world is represented by the gallinaceous, or combative, fowls, you who read this may belong to that' genus, or you may come of a more peaceful and dove-like stock, but if from the latter you show an amazing pugnacity which, dropping the bird metaphor, goes to prove that the Germans and our own ante bellum croakers were a bit out in their prognostications that the British race was decadent, and that the British lower middle class was so steeped in commercialism and the labouring classes in Trade Unionism-relieved by striking and watching professional foot- ball matches-as to be of no account as fighting men.

Events have proved that the race can fight as well as ever it did--all classes and sections of it, “Duke's son, cook's son, or son of a belted earl”; but don't run away with the idea that because you possess the national courage, and your name has appeared in the London Gazette as a Temporary Second Lieutenant, you are by mere virtue of being a commissioned officer also a leader of men j to be that you must possess, or set to work to acquire if you want to be a good officer and not a useless--and therefore in war a dangerous--slacker, the qualities which make for leadership.

I don't suppose you have had time, recently, to indulge in light literature such as Blackwood's Magazine, or the Journal of the Royal Artillery Institution, in which case you will have missed reading in the former the description-under the title "Fallen Angels"--of the gradual, and at times painful, process of forming the young, New Army, officer in a cadet corps, and, in the latter, the very excellent open letter by "Esterel" to the Junior (Artillery) Subaltern.

This is what the author of "Fallen Angels" has to say-and it is worth considering-about the qualities which make for leadership :-" The obvious qualities that an officer must possess. ..are. ...

"(1) The gift of leadership.

"(2) A personality and a character that will command the respect of the men committed to his care.

"(3) A smart personal appearance combined with cleanly and temperate habits, for no man can be expected to respect a leader who never washes, or is seen to be tight, or wandering about in a public place arm in arm with ladies of slight reputation."

Now, if you are a Public School-boy you have started on soldiering as an officer with a great pull over your brother warts (Footnote:-- Wart-an excrescence on the posterior of society-a junior subaltern.) who are not, because, in spite of the admitted shortcomings of a Public School education, Public School discipline is the best training for a leader of men in that it teaches the great lesson of playing the game always, in other words, playing for your side and not for yourself. Politicians, I admit, also play for their own side--or Party-but, while doing so, they play hard for themselves, which makes all the difference. Soldiers never.

In a great, new, improvised Army of several millions it is obviously, impossible that all the young officers can have been at a Public School; nor can they have the benefit of passing leisurely through the good old regimental mill--or school-as did the officers of the Old Army, a mill which, when the crisis of 1914 arrived, had ground out the regimental officers of Mons, Le Cateau, and Ypres. In the New Army the young officer, or Blanc Bec, or wart, has passed straight from the office stool, or from behind the counter, into a position which in war time demands from even the wartiest of warts the highest qualities a man can possess. You, Blanc Bec of the New Army, have displayed on the Somme, the Ancre, or wherever the New Army: has fought, the same bravery as your predecessor j but you fall short of him in many respects, and, believe me, it is in the kindliest spirit that I am writing to point out to you, the latest type of officer, how you so often fail to come up to the accepted, because proved, old standard. I will take the quotation, given above, from “Fallen Angels” as my text, switching on to “Esterel”-to whom I here make all due acknowledgments-at intervals. I cannot hope to better his open letter to the Junior Subaltern and am only attempting to amplify it.

I rather demur to "Fallen Angels" (1) "gift of leadership," because, although great generalship is a gift, and great generals are born, not made, and are somewhat rare, the art of leadership of the smaller units can be acquired, If you do not possess it at the outset ; but (2) “personality and a character that will command the respect of the men committed to your care," seems to me to touch the spot.

As regards personality, "Esterel" asks his gunner Blanc Bec, “Do you command your section? or are you merely in it? Have you got that grip? If you have not you are merely a rather unreliable means of transmitting orders which you are incapable of enforcing. Your men size you up very quickly and, as a rule, with painful accuracy." Now about getting that grip (quite apart from earning the respect of your men) ; it is only to be done by, as "Esterel" says, “looking out for the weak spots in your knowledge and skill and downing them completely one thing at a time." Earlier in his open letter he puts this question to his Junior Subaltern, “Do you know everything about those ordinary everyday things which you are supposed to be au fait with? I do not refer to strategy, military history, or the pack equipment of the Bulgarian infantry. I mean your own job. For instance, is it quite impossible to bowl you out in your knowledge of the following" --and he proceeds to give a list of elementary subjects, knowledge or ignorance of which go to make an efficient or a useless gunner Junior Subaltern.

He writes to the gunner subaltern and deals, for the most part, with gunner subjects, but his advice can be applied universally, and the gist of it is-master the details of your own job and don't depend on your N.C.O.s.--however capable--to make good your ignorance of anything you, as an officer, ought to know concerning your duties and your command-the time may come when, if you have been a slacker, not only your own little lot, your platoon, but your company and battalion and other units right and left of you may be scuppered through your inefficiency. "Nice thought," as "Esterel" remarks. And even if nothing very serious results from your lack of knowledge of the most elementary matters concerning your little job, you will be written down by your superiors and--what is even worse--by your men as an Ass.

"Esterel" gives also very sound advice about not “badgering your men” just to exert your temporary authority; but, on the other hand, do not be afraid of earning unpopularity (it will only be temporary) by enforcing all orders from above, or any you decide that it is necessary to issue yourself. Be absolute boss of your own clump of men and see to it that every man in it looks to you as his boss, passing on any orders, whether from the Field Marshal Commanding- in-Chief, the Corps, the Divisional, the Brigade, or the Battalion Commander, which may not have reached you direct.

I feel I am exploiting "Esterel" unduly--sucking his brains in fact--but before finishing with his model open letter I will quote his formula for power to command.

“Power to command = strength of character + determination + tact.” Working backwards: tact is one of those blessed words like Mesopotamia which can be overdone. Your ultra tactful man is generally a moral coward who follows the line of least resistance-but often arrives at eminence. Don't be too tactful--or, as the sailorman expresses it, "too ---- politeful" in dealing with your men, but again, never damn a man's individual eyes or hold him up to ridicule before his pals-damn the collective eyes of the platoon-and hard- if it deserves it, but treat the individual soldier with the respect he deserves. Determination and strength of character are synonymous terms; if you determine in your own mind that a certain course of action is the one which the platoon is to follow, get it done and no back chat about it. The men will respect you, however young you may be, for having a stiff upper lip.

I assume that, by sticking to your job, you will before very long become an efficient enough officer-within your limitations-but there is more "to it" than military knowledge.

"Fallen Angels" dilates on personal cleanliness; .1 honestly do not believe, from my experience of him, that the New Army young officer omits to wash; quite contrariwise. But he does, at times, cut a queer figure in uniform! and recalls that dreadful creature the "knut."

Don't, Blanc Bec, demean yourself by wearing a fearsome sponge-bag cap--drooping over one eye; it does not look soldierly, and is therefore not "it"; nor are slacks, turned up to display your fancy socks. Certain expressions occur to me. "Good Form"; "Manners Maketh Man"; "Officer and Gentleman"--they all dove-tail. Believe me, no one is quicker to spot and resent being under the command of a bounder than Mr. Thomas Atkins--Old or New.

I do not suppose many Blanc Becs will come across this long screed--or read it to the end, if they do; but if any do, remember always, while you hold the King's commission, that you are the successor of generations of gallant gentlemen who, because they were gentlemen--not very learned perhaps--made the good officers they were and that it is not enough to be without fear--you must also be without reproach, by which I mean you must not bring contempt on your uniform.

VERY IMPORTANT INPUTS - KIND COURTESY ADMIRAL ARUN PRAKASH, FORMER CNS - "REPORT MY SIGNAL" - EMAIL 131/2011 - 31 MAR 2011 (LIST-1)

From: Rajeev Chandrasekhar

Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 8:55 AM

Subject: RE: VERY IMPORTANT INPUTS - KIND COURTESY ADMIRAL ARUN PRAKASH, FORMER CNS - "REPORT MY SIGNAL" - EMAIL 131/2011 - 31 MAR 2011 (LIST-1)

I had met PM on this issue on the 16^th March and he had said OROP is difficult because of the IAS opposition to it. I had again emphasized the very different situations and the increasing alienation of this large group of people. He had shown some softening on it. Lets hope.

RC

From: MKC [mailto:mkcgrd@yahoo.co.uk]
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 6:03 AM
To: mon
Subject: VERY IMPORTANT INPUTS - KIND COURTESY ADMIRAL ARUN PRAKASH, FORMER CNS - "REPORT MY SIGNAL" - EMAIL 131/2011 - 31 MAR 2011 (LIST-1)

Worth some serious reading, coming from the family of two brothers, in two arms of the defence services, one an Ex CNS.......

VETERANS' CAUSE

1. First of all, a 'real life' occurrence, which may be of some interest for us Veterans.

2. I learn reliably, that on 26 March, 2011, at a meeting, a retired Service Chief made a point to the National Security Adviser (NSA), about the Veterans' grievances in the following terms, in the context of our National Security :-

· The alienation of over 2.5 million Veterans is an unnecessary and gratuitous injury that the Government of India is inflicting on itself, because the Armed Forces and their veterans are the strongest upholders of democracy, secularism and the Nation's integrity.

· At this point of time, their dismay originates from two causes. Firstly the insistence of the bureaucracy in contesting every single verdict delivered in favour of ESM by the courts of justice, and then blatantly disregarding verdicts given by the Apex court; secondly the refusal of the Supreme Commander to meet the ESM, while she sees all and sundry, every day !

· The ESM are well connected and in continuous communication with each other. They are also fathers, brothers, uncles and kinsmen of Servicemen and the unhappiness is likely to spread if it hasn't already. This must be seen in the context of the turbulence spreading all round today's world.

· An instant resolution of problems may not be possible, but accord of official recognition IS !

3. It seems that there was no reaction from the NSA to the above projection. However two days later, on 29 March, after the conclusion of a formal meeting of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) with the Prime Minister, to the surprise of the ex-Service Chief (an NSAB member), the NSA motioned him over and told the PM that the ex-Chief wanted a word with him. The PM then invited the latter over to his office and listened to him for about 15 minutes on the Veterans' issues. Ex-Chief's briefing was essentially based upon what is listed above, and surprisingly the PM seemed to agree that ESM were being aggravated, unnecessarily ! But he remarked that "politicians have gone out of their way to make concessions to the ESM", to which the response given was that the implementation was with the Committee of Secretaries and there was a wide-spread apprehension that the Bureaucracy was "up to no good". To the suggestion that the President could give some of her time to meet an ESM delegation, the PM responded that "they want to return their medals, and we cannot have that" ! So the ex-Chief suggested that a few Veterans' representatives could meet the President and hand-over a petition. He seemed to concur with this suggestion. The PM also said that there is a specific department, entirely devoted to the welfare of the ESM, to which the Interlocutor responded by clarifying that this Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) was entirely staffed by the same set of bureaucrats, who specialise in negativism and obstruction, as far as ESM interests are concerned and needed to be staffed on the same pattern as institutions like Minority Commission etc, ie, primarily by the people whose interests are to be safe-guarded. Overall, the PM was kind and courteous and seemed positive about what the ex-Chief said. What the eventual outcome (if any) of this positive discussion would be, remains a matter of conjecture in our sort of polity.

4. That brings me to express an entirely personal opinion, which may not be popular in the current ambiance. After the recent publication of the letter, written to the head of a political party and the PM by Lt Gen SK Bahri (Retd), some of our comrades-in-arms have copiously hinted and suggested that retired Service Chiefs and Lt Gens are "shirkers" as they are not participating in the ongoing Veterans' struggle for justice, and are ingrates in fact, for not returning the favour of lower ranks, for having made them the Chiefs and Generals !!! I humbly suggest that while sincere passion and vehemence do help a cause, but should we forget that we are the Indian Armed Forces Veterans, trying to get justice and NOT a budding "Jasmine Revolution" ! What I know from my short spell in uniform is that Service Chiefs rise basically on their own merit plus seniority (with rare exceptions to prove the rule) and not by popular acclamation of the 'General Body' of Armed Forces ! Let us continue to treat our Chiefs with respect and courtesy, as an institution, as much as we treat the Forces they command as an institution. I do not think it will strengthen our cause, or add dignity to it, if all the ex-Service Chiefs joined-in at Jantar Mantar or shouted slogans on the road; the contrary perhaps ! While as a Veteran, I do feel a deep sense of injustice and grievance vis a vis behavior of today's political dispensation towards us soldiers, and Internet does provide me very ready means to "shoot from the hip", loyalty to the Institution and to comrades-in-arms should still restrain me from excoriating and condemning a whole set of people en bloc, who constitute the key-stone of the Military edifice, when I do not know what each individual thinks or is doing (or has done). We soldiers ought to retain and maintain faith amongst ourselves, or we become a rabble !

5. Though our highest Judiciary acknowledges Chankaya's admonition to the Maurayan State about how its soldiers are to be treated, regretfully our Polity seems to treat it as a joke ! I know of a respected ex- Army Chief who strongly took up the issue of distortions in the 6th CPC recommendations with the highest quarters but was given an entirely 'cold shoulder' at that time. I have also culled from my computer, a letter to the PM by another ex-Chief , written when the 6th CPC report came out (without even an acknowledgment till now) plus a series of four published articles, which touch upon the theme dealt with by General Bahri and subsequently at the PM's meeting on 29 March (please see the attachments). These remain of relevance even today.

6. IESM, with its imaginative and untiring efforts for last three years has certainly succeeded in bringing to fore, the Veterans' cause and sensitised our polity to it. But any contribution by other means, also helps the cause further. It is here that our retired senior officers, can contribute, whatever they can, collectively and/or individually, according to their ingenuity and resource.

7. In the first instance, the foregoing remains a personal communication, and NOT for the 'RmS' as such.

Sincerely,

Rajendra Prakash,

Dehradun.

( Maj Gen Rajendra Prakash, Artillery, Dec 1950 seniority, Former GOC UP Area. He is elder brother of Admiral Arun Prakash, Former Naval Chief.
Gen Prakash came all the way from Dehra Dun to Jantar Mantar, New Delhi, to mark his attendence during the very first IESM Rally at Jantar Mantar.

Admiral Prakash was also among the very first Military Vetetrans to send contributions to IESM.)

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THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER FROM 6^th CPC

by

Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)

The “blame-game” which has inevitably reared its ugly head in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks instantly reminded me of the fervent appeals of three successive Chiefs of R&AW to Naval HQ, in recent years, to loan them naval officers for analysis of maritime intelligence. They were seriously concerned that they did not have the necessary in-house expertise available to draw the right conclusions and inferences from the mass of information the agency collected from open, human and technical sources. And very correctly they approached the Navy.

Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy’s bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy’s duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.

The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation (and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the “status” assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.

The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently “laid down” by some Kafkaesque government department like Personnel & Training. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any other logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. Everybody seemed to be at liberty to twist rules to ensure that he was always “one up” on the Armed Forces.

It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but I felt that Intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that young naval officers did not share this view; and would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.

I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has certainly contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, it is by such acts of omission as well as commission that the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix - to the nation’s detriment.

In a seemingly inexplicable and self-damaging continuum, the GoI appears to have progressively, and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation’s worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and it is the perception of the Armed Forces that every pay commission has contributed to it. Confirming this suspicion is the fact that representation in pay commissions has been consistently denied to the Armed Forces, without assigning any reason. At the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6^th Central Pay Commission (CPC).

Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former.

The steady downward slide of the Armed Forces, over the years, on the Warrant of Precedence totem pole may be a great irritant, but this document is only of ceremonial significance. Of all the deleterious effects of the 6^th CPC, it is the change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries that has the gravest operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level. It should be clear to everyone that in the present scenario, any (further) deterioration in the Army-BSF or Navy-Coast Guard working/operational relationship will only work to the benefit of our enemies.

The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA). To take just one example: the CDA first fixed the pensions of a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier at exactly the same figure, with a Colonel receiving just one hundred rupees less. According to a second letter, a Colonel and Brigadier will draw higher pension than a Major General and a Lieutenant General. No one understands by what earthly logic has guided the 6^th CPC and the CDA!

The GoI has yet again rejected the “one rank on pension” demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today’s and yesterday’s pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that veterans are resorting to hunger strikes; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.

The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.

What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other central services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their “izzat” appears illogical and incomprehensible.

If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that the current imbroglio is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, if untrue, must be dispelled, and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.

Spreading unhappiness, discontent and confusion amongst the nation’s Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve the national interest.

Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?

------------

WHILE WE SLEPT:

POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES

Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)

The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.

Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.

This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.

Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.

Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?. Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.

I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6^th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.

At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.

Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.

The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.

Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicization” of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6^th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.

As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform.

Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation’s intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers’ honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of “politics”. Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.

India’s democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.

This can be done right now, because the election Model Code does not come in the way.

-February 2009

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“…EVEN TO THE PERIL OF MY LIFE”:

ARE WE SHOWING DISDAIN FOR OUR VETERANS?

Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)

“You have answered the trumpet call, and the whole of America is grateful and filled with admiration. I salute you and thank you for your service…I consider myself personally responsible for each and every one of you as though you were my own sons and daughters....”

-Secretary of Defence Robert Gates at the U.S. Naval Academy in April 2010

Our MPs celebrated the unanimous passage of the bill for three-fold enhancement of their pay and perks with yet another undignified rampage in the well of the House. One was struck by the stark contrast between the facile manner in which our elected representatives approved their own pay rise, and the disdain with which the bureaucracy and politicians have been treating the pleas of ex-Servicemen, the nation’s war-wounded and the widows of soldiers; for their just dues of pension and allowances.

Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (now re-designated Armed Forces Veteran) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, the Veteran’s soul cringes at the thought of conducting himself in a manner which, in earlier days, he would have associated with civilian agitators and unbecoming of his uniform. But it seems that he has been left with no choice.

He has found that the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare, created in 2004, is staffed 100% by civilians, who either do not comprehend, or are indifferent to his problems. Therefore his representations to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) gather dust for years, before being dismissed in a perfunctory and bureaucratic manner. One rank one pension (OROP) has been a major demand of the Veterans, which has been hanging fire with the government for many years. Assurances have been given by successive governments – only to be reneged upon.

Despite repeated pleas by the Chiefs of Staff, based on bitter experience of the past, the government in 2005 adamantly refused to appoint a Service representative on the 6^th Central Pay Commission (CPC). As expected, the Commission’s report contained flaws, anomalies and, as some believe, many provisions deliberately incorporated by the bureaucracy to depress the pay and status of armed forces personnel vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts. At the repeated behest of the Chiefs, the government reluctantly convened a committee to review the anomalous CPC recommendations; again, inexplicably, without any armed forces representation. Predictably the committee failed to resolve many tangles and left the serving as well as retired personnel dissatisfied.

On a number of issues relating to pension and allowances the Veterans found that they had no choice but to approach courts of law. After years of expensive litigation the courts did give redressal, but the MoD fought them tooth and nail through appeals to higher courts. In two instances where the Supreme Court eventually gave decisions in the Veteran’s favour, the GoI has perversely refused to implement them! This bizarre sequence is seen by many Veterans, rightly or wrongly, as a blunt expression of contempt by the GoI.

In April 2008, the frustrated Veterans started resorting to demonstrations in the heart of the national capital, as well as in many states to press their demands. Then they graduated to “relay fasts” at Jantar Mantar, and this was followed by the melodramatic gesture of signing petitions in blood. The participants in all these activities ranged from retired jawans and JCOs to General Officers, who braved the bitter cold, blistering sun and rain to convey their unhappiness in public. When the government studiously ignored their pleas, they thought that they would take the “ultimate step”, by surrendering their hard-earned and battle-stained medals to the Supreme Commander; the President of India.

Every commissioned officer of the Indian armed forces swears an Oath of Allegiance which contains the words: “…that I will obey all commands of the President of the Union of India…..even to the peril of my life…” The Veterans were confident that the exalted dignitary, unto whom they had symbolically sworn this blood-oath, at a tender age, would be deeply concerned that the nation’s soldier, sailors and airmen were driven to such an extremity. After all this solemn pledge is redeemed almost every day by their comrades who make the supreme sacrifice to defend the Motherland…even to the peril of their lives.

But they were shaken to the core at the treatment accorded to successive delegations of Veterans which arrived at the portals of Rashtrapati Bhavan to surrender their medals to the Supreme Commander. They were met by low level functionaries who received their medals and sent them away. The medals were then packed in cardboard boxes and sent off to the MoD to be stored in a dusty basement.

The Rashtrapati Bhavan appointment diaries will, on any day, show that dozens of citizens from every walk of life in this great democracy are freely granted audiences with their President. The Supreme Commander of the Indian armed forces has, for two years, not deemed it appropriate to spare a few minutes to meet the venerable Generals and Subedar-Majors who had come to her doorstep; men who have spilt blood on the nation’s battlefields. It is a depressing commentary on the standing of the armed forces in India. The cue has, obviously, been provided by the political establishment which has shown equal disregard and disrespect for the nation’s loyal and patriotic Veterans.

The US President misses no possible opportunity to repeatedly convey gratitude to the nation’s Servicemen for defending the country’s freedom and for making sacrifices in its cause. Since assuming office Barak Obama has made it a point to review the passing-out parades at every Service academy. He has used each occasion to make important national policy statements while addressing the Cadets and Midshipmen; such is the regard and respect that the USA holds its Servicemen in.

Like every year, on 15^th August 2010 too, all Veterans listened raptly to the PM addressing the nation from the ramparts of the historic Red Fort. But we listened in vain. He spoke of many issues but there was not a word about the armed forces; no mention of those who died in action or those maimed for life, or the widows, orphans and grieving parents our soldiers leave behind, ever so often.

The world over, military veterans, are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because, like the flag, they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the people and the government. The nation’s 30 lakh Veterans retain an umbilical connection with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages, and many come from extended families, whom they meet when on leave. Every Serviceman knows that in a few years he will become a Veteran too.

During the last general elections, an attempt was, inevitably, made to politicize Veterans issues, and seek support of one political party or the other. In this age of electronic media, the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar, India Gate or Rashtrapati Bhavan is seen and heard almost instantly by the Jawans serving at the front-line.

India’s democracy requires that the armed forces must retain their dignity, pride and intense professionalism. They must remain detached and totally insulated from politics. The grievances of our Veterans should, therefore, be handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they have so far been. The need of the hour is to defuse their sense of deep hurt and resentment at the seeming neglect by the government. In a democracy this is easily done – by discussion and dialogue.

It was a grave mistake to have allowed our Veterans to take to the streets, and we must remedy it at the earliest. The best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission to examine and address the full gamut of Veterans’ issues and grievances on a long-term basis.

THE END